We study the effects of communication in Bayesian games when the players are sequentially rational but some combinations of types have zero probability. Not all communication equilibria can be implemented as sequential equilibria. We define the set of strong sequential communication equilibria (SSCE) and characterize it. SSCE differs from the concept of sequential communication equilibrium (SCE) defined by Myerson [Myerson, R.B., 1986. Multistage games with communication. Econometrica 54, 323-358] in that SCE allows the possibility of trembles by the mediator. We show that these two concepts coincide when there are three or more players, but the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE for two-player games.
Introduction
Consider a static Bayesian game (Harsanyi, 1967 (Harsanyi, -1968 and suppose that the players can communicate with one another and with a trustworthy mediator before choosing their actions. Communication gives to the players the opportunity to exchange their information and coordinate
Bayesian games with communication
Let G = (T 1 , . . . , T n , A 1 , . . . , A n , u 1 , . . . , u n , p) be a finite Bayesian game. The set of players is N = {1, . . . , n}. T i is the set of types of player i andT = i∈N T i is the set of type profiles.
We let T ⊆T denote the set of profiles of types that are possible, i.e., that occur with strictly positive probability. Any profile of types that does not belong to T occurs with probability zero and is considered impossible by the players. In other words, under no circumstances will the players have beliefs that assign positive probability to the type profiles outside the set T . 2 We let p ∈ Δ 0 (T ) denote the probability distribution of the possible profiles of types. 3 Without loss of generality, we assume that every type of every player has strictly positive probability. That is, for every i ∈ N and every t i ∈ T i , p(t i ) ≡ t −i ∈T −i p(t −i , t i ) > 0, whereT −i = j =i T j denotes the set of type profiles of the players different from i.
The set of actions available to player i is A i . We let A = i∈N A i denote the set of action profiles, and A −i = j =i A j be the set of action profiles of player i's opponents. The payoff function of player i is u i : T × A → R.
We say that G is a game with full support if T =T , i.e., if all profiles of types have strictly positive probability. For notational convenience, when the game G does not have full support we extend the probability distribution p toT by setting p(t) = 0 for every t ∈T \T . Similarly, for each player i ∈ N , we extend the payoff function u i to the setT × A by setting u i (t, a) = 0 for every t ∈T \T , and every a ∈ A.
An outcome of the game G is a mapping fromT into Δ(A) that assigns a probability distribution over action profiles to every profile of types. Of course, we are only interested in the outcomes associated with the type profiles that are possible. However, it is convenient to extend the domain of an outcome to the whole set of type profilesT .
It is well known that pre-play communication expands the set of outcomes that the players can implement. This is possible because communication allows the players to exchange their information and to coordinate their actions. The goal of this paper is provide a better understanding of the benefits and the limits of communication.
We therefore assume that the players can communicate with one another and with an impartial mediator before playing the game G. We consider extensive-form games in which the players first exchange messages and then choose their actions (messages are "cheap" in the sense that they do not affect directly the players' payoffs). Of course, there are different solution concepts to analyze these extensive-form games with communication. The notion of communication equilibrium characterizes the set of outcomes of G that can be implemented with communication when the solution concept is BNE. 2 For example, suppose that the types of player 1 and 2 denote the realization of a certain random variable. Suppose also that both players observe the random variable (i.e., the realization is common knowledge between the two players). Then player i = 1, . . . , n will never believe that the first two players have different types.
3 Given any finite set Z, we let Δ(Z) denote the set of probability distributions over Z. We also let Δ 0 (Z) denote the interior of Δ(Z). That is, Δ 0 (Z) is the set of probability distributions that assign strictly positive probability to every element of Z. 
Definition 1 (Communication Equilibrium). A mapping μ :T → Δ(A) is a communication equilibrium of G if and only if:
Consider the following game with communication. The players announce their types to the mediator. For each profile of announcements t, the mediator randomly selects an action profile according to the probability distribution μ(t) and informs each player of his own action. This game is usually called the canonical game. Inequality (1) guarantees that the canonical game admits a BNE in which the players announce their types truthfully and follow the mediator's recommendation. Clearly, this equilibrium implements the outcome μ.
On the other hand, it follows from the revelation principle for Bayesian games that if an outcome can be implemented in BNE with communication then the same outcome can also be implemented with a canonical game and with a BNE in which the players are sincere and obedient (see Myerson, 1982 and Forges, 1986) . Thus, the set of outcomes of a Bayesian game G that can be implemented in BNE with communication is equal to the set of communication equilibria of G. We denote this set by CE (G) .
Since games with communication are extensive-form games it is natural to consider solution concepts stronger than BNE and require the players to be rational both on and off the equilibrium path. In this paper, we use the solution concept of SE introduced by Kreps and Wilson (1982) .
It is obvious that the set of outcomes of G that can be implemented in SE with communication cannot be larger than CE (G) . It is also easy to see that if G is a game with full support and μ is a communication equilibrium of G, then the corresponding canonical game admits an SE in which the players are sincere and, after being sincere, they are also obedient. Intuitively, if G has full support all the recommendations that a sincere player can possibly receive are on path. Upon receiving a recommendation, the sincere player cannot have an incentive to deviate since it is ex-ante optimal for him to be obedient. 4 We conclude that in games with full support there is no difference between implementation in BNE and implementation in SE. If G is a game with full support, then the set of outcomes that can be implemented in SE with communication is equal to CE(G).
This result does not extend to games that do not have full support. The following example (taken from Gerardi, 2004) demonstrates that not all communication equilibria can be implemented in SE when some profiles of types have zero probability.
Example 1 (A communication equilibrium that cannot be implemented in SE).
Consider the following two-person game G . The sets of types of player 1 and 2 are T 1 = {t 1 , v 1 } and T 2 = {t 2 , v 2 }, respectively. The probability of the type profile (v 1 , v 2 ) is zero. All the 4 Of course, a player who does not report his true type may prefer to disobey the mediator's recommendation. This, however, does not affect the incentives of a sincere player. In fact, in the SE that we are considering a sincere player assigns probability zero to the event that his opponents lie about their types. 
other type profiles are equally likely. Player 1 chooses an action from the set A 1 = {a, b, c} and player 2 has no action available. Table 1 describes the players' payoffs. For each combination of type profile and action, we report the corresponding vector of payoffs (the first entry denotes the payoff of player 1).
Notice that in any BNE of G , type v 1 of player 1 plays action b, and type t 1 chooses either a, or c, or a randomization between the two actions.
It is easy to show that CE(G ), the set of communication equilibria of G , is strictly larger than the set of BNE outcomes of G . A communication equilibrium that does not belong to the set of BNE outcomes of G is, for example, μ defined by:
where we adopt the convention of writing, for example,
Notice that μ is the (unique) communication equilibrium that maximizes the expected payoff of player 1. We now show that when the players are sequentially rational the set of outcomes that can be implemented with communication is strictly smaller than CE(G ). Consider an arbitrary game with communication. Suppose that each player sends a message to the mediator. Let M i denote the set of messages available to player i = 1, 2. After receiving a vector of messages (m 1 , m 2 ), the mediator chooses a message from the set S 1 (at random, according to some probability distribution) and sends it to player 1. Finally, player 1 chooses his action.
In this game with communication, type v 1 will play action b after sending any message m 1 and receiving any message s 1 (type v 1 knows that his opponent is of type t 2 ). Furthermore, type t 1 of player 1 will never play b (independent of player 2's type, b is strictly dominated by a and c).
We now show that if μ :
is an outcome of G that can be implemented in SE with communication, then μ(t 1 , t 2 ) = μ(t 1 , v 2 ). In fact, both types of player 2 prefer action c to any other action when the type of player 1 is t 1 . Suppose, by contradiction, that there exists an SE of the game with communication that induces an outcome μ with μ(c | t 1 , t 2 ) > μ(c | t 1 , v 2 ). Then type v 2 would have an incentive to deviate and mimic the behavior of type t 2 to increase the probability of c. Similarly, suppose that an SE induces an outcome μ with μ(c | t 1 , t 2 ) < μ(c | t 1 , v 2 ). Type t 2 knows that, independent of his strategy, type v 1 of player 1 will choose action b. Thus, type t 2 has an incentive to mimic the behavior of type v 2 : if player 1 has type t 1 the probability of action c will increase.
We therefore conclude that the set of outcomes of G that can be implemented in SE with communication coincides with the set of BNE outcomes of G . If the players are sequentially rational, communication cannot expand the set of outcomes that can be implemented.
As Example 1 points out, the reason why a communication equilibrium may not be implementable in SE is that obedience fails to be sequentially rational after recommendations that have zero probability. The notion of BNE allows a player to obey a recommendation to play even a dominated action, provided that in equilibrium this recommendation occurs with probability zero. Clearly, obedience to dominated actions can never be sequentially rational. As this seems to suggest, the notion of SE will put some restrictions on the actions that the mediator can possibly recommend.
Although not all communication equilibria of the game G can be implemented in SE, the revelation principle is still valid in Example 1. Clearly, any BNE of G can be implemented in SE with a (trivial) canonical game in which the mediator's recommendation depends only on the type announced by player 1. However, it turns out that when some profiles of types have zero probability the class of canonical games may be too restrictive. Our next example illustrates this point. We show that by considering games with communication different from the canonical ones it is possible to expand the set of outcomes that are implementable in SE. 5
Example 2 (A communication equilibrium that cannot be implemented with the canonical game).
G is a two-person Bayesian game. The sets of types of player 1 and 2 are T 1 = {t 1 , v 1 } and T 2 = {t 2 , v 2 , w 2 }, respectively. The probability of the type profile (v 1 , w 2 ) is zero. All the other type profiles are equally likely. Player 1 chooses an action from the set A 1 = {a, b, c, d, e} and player 2 has no action available.
The players' payoffs are described in Table 2 (the first entry denotes the payoff of player 1). The communication equilibrium μ that maximizes the expected utility of player 1 is unique and equal to:
Consider the canonical game in which the mediator selects the recommendations according to the function μ. It is easy to check that there is no SE that induces μ. In the canonical game, the outcome μ can be implemented only if each type of player 2 sends a different message (notice that μ associates three different actions to the profiles of types (t 1 , t 2 ), (t 1 , v 2 ) and (t 1 , w 2 )). 
A similar result appears in Dhillon and Mertens (1996) . A perfect correlated equilibrium of a game with complete information is an outcome that can be implemented with communication when the solution concept is trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Dhillon and Mertens show that not all perfect correlated equilibria can be implemented with canonical games.
In other words, player 2's strategy must be fully revealing. Thus, without loss of generality, we assume that player 2 reports his type truthfully. We also let λ denote the probability that type v 1 announces his true type. Clearly, there can be an SE which induces outcome μ and in which player 2 is sincere only if the strategy of player 1 satisfies the following two conditions. (i) Suppose λ < 1. Then type v 1 randomizes between actions a and b (with equal probabilities) after announcing message t 1 and receiving recommendation c.
(ii) Suppose λ > 0. Then type v 1 must obey all recommendations after sending message v 1 . Consider now type v 1 of player 1. Action a is optimal for type v 1 only if the probability that player 2 has type t 2 belongs to the interval [2/3, 8/9]. On the other hand, action b is optimal for type v 1 only if the probability that player 2 has type t 2 belongs to the interval [1/9, 1/3]. Clearly condition (i) cannot be satisfied since it is never optimal for type v 1 to randomize between a and b. Consider condition (ii). The beliefs of type v 1 over his opponent's types when he receives recommendation a must be the same as the beliefs when he receives recommendation b. It follows that it cannot be sequentially rational for type v 1 to obey both the recommendation a and the recommendation b and condition (ii) is violated. This proves that μ cannot be implemented with the canonical game.
Consider now the following game with communication. Each player sends a message to the mediator. The set of messages available to player 1 is M 1 = T 1 (i.e., player 1 announces his type). The set of messages available to player 2 is M 2 = {t 2 , v 2 , w 2 ,m 2 ,m 2 }. For each vector of messages m ∈ M 1 × M 2 , the mediator randomly selects an action according to the probability distribution γ (m) ∈ Δ(A 1 ) (see below). Then the mediator recommends the chosen action to player 1. Finally, player 1 chooses an action from the set A 1 . The mapping γ : M 1 × M 2 → Δ(A 1 ) used by the mediator is given by:
This game with communication admits an SE with the following features. First, both players announce their types truthfully. Second, after he announces his type truthfully, player 1 obeys any recommendation.
We now construct consistent beliefs that make it sequentially rational for type v 1 to obey the recommendations a and b (it is trivial to check that all the other constraints are satisfied). Suppose that along the sequence of completely mixed strategies type t 2 sends message v 2 andm 2 with probability ε 2 each, and message w 2 andm 2 with probability 2ε each. Type v 2 sends messages t 2 andm 2 with probability ε 2 each, and message w 2 andm 2 with probability 2ε each. Then upon receiving recommendation a (b) type v 1 believes that with probability 3/4 (1/4) player 2 has type t 2 . It follows that it is optimal for type v 1 to follow the recommendation. Clearly, the SE described above implements the outcome μ (notice that γ (t) = μ(t) for every profile of types t ∈ T 1 × T 2 ).
Example 2 implies that there can be loss of generality in restricting attention to canonical games when the solution concept is SE. In particular, the example emphasizes the importance of endowing the players with sets of messages that are larger than their sets of types. In this paper, we consider the following class of games with communication. Consider a Bayesian game G. A game with communication is denoted by (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ) . For every i ∈ N, M i and S i are two arbitrary finite sets of messages. Moreover:
where M = i∈N M i and S = i∈N S i .
The game (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ) proceeds as follows. Player i sends a message m i ∈ M i to the mediator. The players send their messages simultaneously. After receiving the vector of messages m ∈ M, the mediator randomly chooses an element s ∈ S with probability γ (s | m) and sends message s i to every player i ∈ N . Then the players choose their actions.
In the class of games with communication that we consider the players send and receive only one message. However, our approach does not depend on there being only one round of communication. Any outcome that can be implemented (in SE) with several rounds of communication can be also implemented in a game of the form (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ). If there are multiple rounds, it is enough to let M i be player i's set of all possible strategies for sending messages over the various rounds (conditioned at each round on the messages that i has received earlier), and S i be the set of all possible sequence of messages that i could receive. 6 Given a game with communication (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ), we define the set M i ⊗ S i as follows:
In words, a pair (m i , s i ) belongs to the set M i ⊗ S i if and only if player i can receive message s i after reporting m i to the mediator. Thus, the set M i ⊗ S i denotes the collection of information sets at the action stage of each type of player i.
In the game (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ), the strategy of player i consists of the following two functions:
The function σ M i specifies how player i chooses his message while the function σ A i describes how he chooses his action. We denote by σ i = (σ M i , σ A i ) player i's strategy and by σ = (σ i ) i∈N a profile of strategies. We also let σ M = (σ M i ) i∈N denote the profile of message strategies. At the action stage player i = 1, . . . , n has beliefs over the types of his opponents and the messages they sent. Then he can use his opponents' action strategies to generate a system of beliefs over their types and the actions that they will play. Notice that these are the relevant beliefs for player i. This is because messages do not affect the players' payoffs (recall that messages are cheap talk). Thus, player i's beliefs are described by the function
After announcing message m i and receiving message s i , type t i assigns probability φ i (t −i , a −i | t i , m i , s i ) to the event that his opponents have the profile of types t −i and will choose the profile of actions a −i . We let φ = (φ i ) i∈N denote a profile of beliefs.
An assessment (σ, φ) constitutes an SE of the game (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ) if and only if: (i) for every player i ∈ N , the message strategy σ M i is a best response to the strategy profile σ −i (given σ A i ); (ii) for every i ∈ N , the action strategy σ A i is sequentially rational given the beliefs φ i ; and (iii) the system of beliefs φ is consistent with σ in the sense that φ is the limit of the beliefs computed using a sequence of completely mixed messages strategy profiles
induces an outcome of G, i.e. a mapping μ :T → Δ(A), in the following way:
Definition 2 (Strong Sequential Communication Equilibrium). A mapping μ :T → Δ(A) is a strong sequential communication equilibrium (SSCE) if and only if there exists a game with communication (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ) with an SE (σ, φ) that induces μ.
As mentioned above, in games with full support the set of SSCE and the set of communication equilibria coincide. In the rest of the paper, we characterize the set of SSCE for Bayesian games without full support.
Sequential communication equilibria
The fact that we require the players to be sequentially rational forces us to specify the players' beliefs after zero probability events. The notion of SSCE is based on the original definition of SE of Kreps and Wilson (1982) . This means that only the players, but not the mediator, are allowed to tremble. Thus, if player i follows his equilibrium message strategy σ M i and receives a zero probability message s i , then he must believe that one or more of his opponents deviated at the message stage. This, in turn, implies that we need to specify the actions that the players choose after they deviate at the message stage. Without specifying these actions it is not possible to check whether the action strategies are sequentially rational.
A different approach is to allow also the mediator to tremble. Although the mediator is supposed to select the messages according to some probability distribution, he can make small mistakes. Thus, a player who receives a zero probability message can now believe that either his opponents deviated or that they did follow their equilibrium strategies but the mediator made a mistake. This approach leads to the notion of SCE introduced by Myerson (1986) .
It is convenient to start the analysis with the formal definition of SCE. Then we characterize the set of SCE of a Bayesian game. Finally, in the next two sections, we analyze the relationship between SCE and SSCE.
At this point we need to introduce some additional concepts. We shall provide an informal description of these concepts right after Definition 3.
A mediation range Q = (Q i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i is a function that assigns a set of actions Q i (t i ) ⊆ A i to every type t i of every player i.
Let a mediation range Q = (Q i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i be given. For every type profile t ∈T , we let Q(t) = i Q i (t i ). We also let the set T ⊗ Q be equal to
a): t ∈ T and a ∈ Q(t) .
Further, for any type t i we let the set (T ⊗ Q) −i (t i ) be defined by:
Finally, given an outcome μ :T → Δ(A), we construct the mediation range R μ = (R μ i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i as follows. For every i and every t i we let
Intuitively, suppose that the players announce their types to the mediator and that the mediator uses the function μ to select a profile of recommendations. The set R μ i (t i ) contains all the recommendations that player i could receive when he announces t i and the other players announce types that may be different from their true types.
We are now ready to define the notion of SCE. 
Definition 3 (Sequential Communication Equilibrium
and
where β i (t −i , a −i | t i , a i ) is given by:
Fix a communication equilibrium μ and consider the associated canonical game. We know that the game admits a BNE in which the players are sincere and obedient. Clearly, the notion of communication equilibrium does not require that a sincere player have an incentive to obey recommendations that are off the equilibrium path. This is the additional requirement of the notion of SCE.
Let us reconsider the canonical game. Q i (t i ) denotes the set of possible recommendations that player i can receive when he announces type t i . Given a profile of reports t, the mediator should select an action profile randomly according to the probability distribution μ(t). However, the mediator makes mistakes and instead uses the probability distributions μ k (t) (k = 1, 2, . . .). Notice, however, that when player i announces t i , the mediator never recommends an action outside the set Q i (t i ). In the limit the probability of every mistake goes to zero.
Suppose that player i reveals his true type t i . Upon receiving a recommendation a i ∈ Q i (t i ), the player can use the sequence {μ k } ∞ k=1 to compute his beliefs over his opponents' types and recommendations. Constraint (5) guarantees that it is optimal for player i to obey the recommendation a i provided that his opponents are sincere and obedient (upon being sincere).
The definition of SCE does not specify the actions that the players choose after they lie to the mediator. We can ignore those actions because implicit in the definition of SCE is the idea that a player assigns probability zero to the event that his opponents have lied. Notice, in fact, that any recommendation that a sincere player may receive can be explained by actions of the trembling mediator without any deviations by the other players (recall that R μ i (t i ) ⊆ Q i (t i )). 7 We now turn to the characterization of the set of SCE of a Bayesian game. First, this set is never empty. Clearly, the outcome induced by a BNE of any Bayesian game G is an SCE of G. Second, any communication equilibrium μ of a game with full support is also an SCE. In fact, when T =T we can take the set of possible recommendations Q i (t i ) to be equal to R μ i (t i ) because all recommendations in R μ i (t i ) will indeed have positive probability. Then constraint (5) is satisfied for any sequence {μ k } ∞ k=1 that converges to μ. In games without full support, however, communication equilibria and SCE are not equivalent concepts. For example, the communication equilibrium described in Example 1 fails to be an SCE. Obviously, type v 1 of player 1 will never obey the recommendation to play the dominated action a.
The fact that in an SCE it has to be sequentially rational for a sincere player to obey all recommendations clearly puts some restrictions on the messages that the mediator can possibly send. For example, a player will never obey a recommendation to play a dominated action. Once we rule out dominated actions, we can go one step further. A player will never play an action that is optimal if and only if at least one of his opponents plays a dominated action. And this process goes on. Therefore, to characterize the set of SCE it is crucial to determine the actions that can be possible recommendations. To do this, we need to introduce the concept of codomination (Myerson, 1986) .
Consider a Bayesian game G. Recall that T denotes the set of type profiles of G that have strictly positive probability.
Definition 4 (Codominated Actions). A mediation range B = (B i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i is codominated if
there does not exist a probability distribution π ∈ Δ(T × A) such that:
Suppose that B = (B i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i is a codominated system of actions. Let us assume that the players report their types truthfully to the mediator and that the mediator randomly selects a profile of recommendations according to some probability distribution. This process generates a probability distribution π over the set T × A. Suppose that there is a positive probability that a player receives a recommendation to play a codominated action. Then it is impossible that all 7 Notice also that it is without loss of generality to assume that a sincere player assigns probability zero to the event that his opponents have lied to the mediator. When the players are sequentially rational and the mediator is allowed to tremble, the set of SCE represents the largest set of outcomes that can be implemented with communication. The basic idea is that the mediator can always replicate the players' tremble. See Myerson (1986) for details. See also Theorem 2 below.
obedience constraints are satisfied. In other words, there is at least one player who has a strictly incentive to disobey at least one recommendation.
Although Definition 4 is rather intuitive, occasionally it will be convenient to work with the following equivalent definition.
Definition 5 (Codominated Actions-Dual Definition).
A mediation range B = (B i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i is codominated if there exists a vector α = (α i (a i | t i , a i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i ,(a i ,a i )∈A 2 i with nonnegative components and such that:
The nonnegative number α i (a i | t i , a i ) may be interpreted as the shadow price for the incentive constraint that type t i of player i should not expect to gain by using action a i when he is told to choose action a i . If the mediator recommends a codominated action at least to one player, then the aggregate value of the incentive constraints is negative.
As already mentioned, the two definitions of codominated systems of actions are equivalent. For completeness, we state this result formally. The proof is a simple application of the duality theorem of linear programming and is therefore omitted. Let B and B be two mediation ranges. We say that the mediation range B is the union of B and B if for every player i ∈ N and every type t i ∈ T i , B i (t i ) = B i (t i ) ∪ B i (t i ). It is easy to show that if two mediation ranges are codominated, then their union is also a codominated system of actions. 8 Since the game G is finite there are finitely many codominated systems of actions. We let E = (E i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i denote the union of all codominated systems. In other words, E is the maximal codominated system. We also letQ = (Q i (t i )) i∈N,t i ∈T i denote the mediation range that remains after eliminating all codominated actions for all types of all players. Formally, for every i ∈ N and every t i ∈ T i :
It should be emphasized that the mediation rangeQ is nonempty becauseQ i (t i ) includes all the actions that type t i of player i uses with positive probability in any BNE of the original game G (for details, see the proof of Lemma 2 in Appendix A).
We are now ready to provide a complete characterization of the set of SCE. The following theorem is a special case of Theorem 2 in Myerson (1986) . Theorem 1. (Myerson, 1986) A communication equilibrium μ is an SCE if and only if for every i ∈ N and every t i ∈ T i :
Proof. In Appendix A. 2 Theorem 1 reduces the problem of finding all SCE of a Bayesian game to the simpler problem of determining the largest codominated system of actions E. Once we know E it is easy to check whether a mapping μ :T → Δ(A) constitutes an SCE. In fact, μ is an SCE if and only if it satisfies two types of linear constraints. The first type of constraints guarantees that μ is a communication equilibrium. The second type of constraints requires that μ assigns probability zero to any codominated action. It follows that the set of SCE of a Bayesian game is a convex polyhedron.
Relationship between the sets of SCE and SSCE
In this section we compare the solution concepts SCE and SSCE. As their names suggest, SSCE is a stronger solution concept than SCE. More precisely, we shall show that the two concepts coincide in games with three or more players. However, in two-person games without full support the set of SSCE may be strictly smaller than the set of SCE.
Our first result considers a Bayesian game with an arbitrary number of players. It shows that if an outcome can be implemented with the players' trembles then it can also be implemented with the mediator's trembles.
Theorem 2. Consider a Bayesian game G. If μ is an SSCE of G then μ is also an SCE of G.
Proof. In Appendix A. 2
The proof of Theorem 2 extends the logic of the revelation principle to the trembles. Consider a game with communication (G, (M i 
denote the corresponding sequence of completely mixed message strategies. We construct a canonical game in which the players announce their types to the mediator. Then the mediator uses the strategies σ M to determine the messages that the players would send in equilibrium. In this stage of the game, however, the mediator can make small mistakes and choose the wrong messages. We use the sequence {σ M,k } ∞ k=1 to determine the probability of these mistakes. Moreover, the mediator uses the function γ and the equilibrium strategies σ A to determine the actions to recommend to the players. In this stage of the game the mediator does not tremble.
The fact that the mediator trembles according to the probability distributions {σ M,k } ∞ k=1 and the strategies σ A i , . . . , σ A n are sequentially rational implies that it is in the best interest of every player to obey all possible recommendations (even those that have zero probability).
We now investigate whether the opposite of Theorem 2 holds. Is it possible to implement an SCE when only the players but not the mediator tremble? The answer is affirmative provided that there are at least three players.
Theorem 3. Consider a Bayesian game G with n 3 players. If μ is an SCE of G then μ is also an SSCE of G.
We now provide an informal description of the proof and explain why it requires at least three players. Given an SCE μ, we construct a game with communication and an SE that induces μ.
We require that the game with communication is finite in the sense that the sets of messages available to the players and to the mediator contain finitely many elements. This requirement forces us to establish a preliminary result which we now describe. Given an SCE μ, the players' beliefs are derived from the infinite sequence {μ k } ∞ k=1 converging to μ. We show that it is possible to generate the same beliefs by specifying only finitely many mappings from T into Δ(A). More precisely, given {μ k } ∞ k=1 we construct a finite sequence of mappings {μ 1 , . . . ,μ L } such that: (i)μ 1 (t) = μ(t) for every type profile t ∈ T . (ii) Suppose that the mediator uses the functionμ , = 2, . . . , L, with probability ε −1 and the functionμ 1 = μ with the remaining probability. Then as ε goes to zero these trembles generate exactly the same beliefs as the original sequence {μ k } ∞ k=1 (see the proof for details). Our game with communication is as follows. The message that each player sends to the mediator has two components. In particular, each player i announces his type and a number in {1, . . . , L}, where L is the length of the sequence {μ 1 , . . . ,μ L } defined above. Suppose that the players report the profile of types t. If t is not an element of T then the mediator selects a profile of recommendations (i.e., a profile of actions) according to the probability distribution μ(t). Suppose now that t belongs to T , and let˜ = 1, . . . , L denote the second largest integer announced by the players (or the largest integer if this is announced by two or more players). In this case, the mediator selects a profile of recommendation according to the probability distributionμ˜ (t) defined above.
In equilibrium, every player is sincere (i.e., announces his type truthfully) and reports the number one. Moreover, a sincere player obeys every recommendation (both when he reports the number one and when he announces a number larger than one). The fact that μ is a communication equilibrium and that it takes at least two players to induce the mediator to ignore μ implies that no player has an incentive to deviate at the message stage. It remains to show that it is sequentially rational for a sincere player to obey all recommendations.
We consider a sequence of completely mixed message strategies that converge to the equilibrium strategies and satisfy the following two properties: (i) if z i > z i 2, then it is much more likely that player i is sincere and announces z i than he is sincere and announces z i . In other words, sincere players are more likely to announce small integers. (ii) The deviations in which a player lies about his type are much less likely than the deviations in which the player is sincere. In particular, we assume that it is more likely that two players are sincere and announce two arbitrary numbers than a single player lies about his type.
The two properties mentioned above have the following important implication. The beliefs of a sincere player are identical to the beliefs derived from the mediator's trembles. Then it follows from the definition of the SCE μ that it is optimal for the player to obey every recommendation he receives. It is important to emphasize that this holds even when the sincere player announces a number different from one.
At this point it should also be clear why our proof requires three or more players. Suppose that n = 2. Suppose also that player 1 is sincere, announces the number one and receives a recommendation that has zero probability when player 2 follows the equilibrium strategy. What should player 1 believe? It must be the case that player 2 has lied about his type. The beliefs derived from the mediator's trembles are of no use in this case. Clearly, this problem does not arise with three or more players. In fact, each player can believe that two of his opponents were sincere but announced a number different from one.
Two-person games
Theorem 3 does not cover the case n = 2. It is clear that the logic of our proof does not apply when there are only two players. However, at this point it is still an open question whether there is any difference between SCE and SSCE for n = 2. Our next example answers this question. We construct a two-person Bayesian game with the set of SSCE strictly included in the set of SCE.
Example 3 (Theorem 3 does not hold for n = 2).
G is a two-person Bayesian game. The sets of types of player 1 and 2 are T 1 = {t 1 , v 1 } and T 2 = {t 2 , v 2 , w 2 }, respectively. The probability of the type profile (v 1 , w 2 ) is zero. All the other type profiles are equally likely. The sets of actions of player 1 and 2 are A 1 = {a, b, c} and A 2 = {d, e}, respectively. The players' payoffs are described in Table 3 (the first entry denotes the payoff of player 1).
We claim that the SCE μ that maximizes the expected payoff of player 1 is unique and equal to:
where we write, for example,
Obviously it is impossible to do better than μ since player 1 obtains the highest possible payoff in every single state. It is also easy to verify that μ is a communication equilibrium. To prove that it is also sequential, we need to demonstrate that type v 1 of player 1 has an incentive to obey the recommendation to play action a. Consider the following mediation range Q:
The mediator's trembles are described by a (converging) sequence {μ k } ∞ k=1 that satisfies: −3, 1 a 0, −10 0, −11 a −2, 0 1, −1
It follows that β 1 (v 1 , a) , the beliefs of type v 1 when he is sincere and receives a, assign probability one to the event that player 2 has type v 2 and will play action e. This, in turn, implies that action a is optimal for type v 1 and that μ is an SCE.
Suppose now that μ is a communication equilibrium under which player 1 obtains his highest payoff in every state. Then μ ((a, e) | (v 1 , v 2 ) 
otherwise type v 2 would have an incentive to lie to the mediator and report message w 2 . Notice that action e is strictly dominated for type w 2 . Therefore, in any SCE w 2 must receive the recommendation to play d. This shows that μ is the unique SCE that maximizes the expected payoff of player 1.
We now demonstrate that μ is not an SSCE ofG. By contradiction, suppose that there exists a game with communication (G, M 1 , M 2 , S 1 , S 2 , γ ) and an SE (σ, φ) that induces μ. Let S i (m i ) denote the set of messages that player i could receive when he announces m i and his opponent announces an arbitrary message:
Furthermore, for every i = 1, 2 and every type τ i ∈ T i , letM i (τ i ) be the set of messages used in equilibrium by τ i :
Notice that the setsM 2 (t 2 ),M 2 (v 2 ) andM 2 (w 2 ) must be pairwise disjoint otherwise the SE (σ, φ) cannot induce μ. Moreover, the SE (σ, φ) must satisfy the following condition. Consider
If the above equality fails, type v 2 of player 2 has an incentive to deviate and choose a message from the setM 2 (w 2 ) (and then play action d).
Consider now a pair (m 1 ,ŝ 1 ) such thatm 1 ∈M 1 (v 1 ),ŝ 1 ∈ S 1 (m 1 ) and σ A 1 (a | v 1 ,m 1 ,ŝ 1 ) > 0. Obviously, it is sequentially rational for type v 1 to play action a only if he certain that his opponent is of type v 2 and will play action e. Formally, we have φ 1 (v 2 , e | v 1 ,m 1 ,ŝ 1 ) = 1. This, in turn, implies that there must be a pair (m 2 ,ŝ 2 ) such that: (i) γ (ŝ 1 ,ŝ 2 |m 1 ,m 2 ) > 0; and (ii) σ A 2 (e | v 2 ,m 2 ,ŝ 2 ) > 0. Suppose now that type v 2 of player 2 sends messagem 2 and receivesŝ 2 . We claim that he must assign positive probability to the pair (v 1 , a):
But we have now reached a contradiction. In fact, σ A 2 (e | v 2 ,m 2 ,ŝ 2 ) must be equal to zero when φ 2 (v 1 , a | v 2 ,m 2 ,ŝ 2 ) > 0 because action e is optimal for type v 2 if and only if player 1 puts probability zero on action a.
The example above shows that when there are two players it makes a difference whether or not we assume that the mediator can make mistakes. Now that we know that the concepts of SSCE and SCE are not equivalent, we face the problem of characterizing the set of SSCE for n = 2. This problem is complicated by the fact that the class of games with communication to consider is potentially extremely large. In fact, we have already demonstrated in Example 2 that not all SSCE can be implemented with a canonical game. In some cases the set of messages that a player can send to the mediator must be larger than his set of types. It would therefore be useful to put some restrictions on the games that it is necessary to analyze. In what follows, we develop a simple procedure that allows us to find all SSCE of a Bayesian game with two players.
Consider a two-person Bayesian game G = (T 1 , T 2 , A 1 , A 2 , u 1 , u 2 , p). Without loss of generality, we assume that each player i = 1, 2 has at least one action available and define n i = |T i |(|A i | − 1). In the rest of the section, we use i to denote an arbitrary player and j to denote his opponent.
Our goal is to construct a class of games with communication in which all SSCE can be implemented. We letM i denote the set of messages available to player i. We assume thatM i is equal to:
with an arbitrary element denoted by m i = (t i , z i ).
The product setM 1 ×M 2 will not play any role in our analysis. Instead, we shall often consider the set of pairs of messages in which at least one player announces the number zero. We useM to denote this set. Thus, we have:
Throughout the section we let ρ denote an arbitrary function fromM into the set Δ(A). Given a function ρ, we construct the set P i (ρ), i = 1, 2, as follows:
Intuitively, suppose that the players send their messages to the mediator who then selects a pair of recommendations (actions) randomly, according to ρ. Suppose also that each player is expected to announce his type truthfully (i.e., to be sincere) and to report the number zero. For brevity, we refer to this behavior as "correct" behavior. A pair (t i , a i ) belongs to the set P i (ρ) if a i is an "unexpected" recommendation for type t i when he behaves correctly. That is, a i is a recommendation that t i can receive only if his opponent behaves incorrectly.
We say that a function ρ :M → Δ(A) is admissible if the following condition holds. For each pair (t i , a i ) ∈ P i (ρ), i = 1, 2, there exists a triple (t j , z j , a j ) ∈M j × A j such that 9
Notice that there are two different forms of incorrect behavior. A player can either lie about his type, or the player can reveal his type truthfully and choose a number different from zero. The fact that ρ is admissible has the following implication. If type t i behaves correctly and receives the unexpected recommendation a i , then he is not forced to believe that the opponent lied about his type. It is conceivable that the opponent revealed his true type and announced a strictly positive integer.
Clearly, to describe what a player should believe after receiving an unexpected recommendation we need to derive a consistent system of beliefs. This, in turn, requires considering the players' trembles. Thus, we now introduce a pair of functions f = (f 1 , f 2 ) with: Given an admissible function ρ and a pair of functions f = (f 1 , f 2 ) we construct the systems of beliefs as follows. Fix a pair (t i , a i ) in the set P i (ρ). We let β i (· | t i , a i ; ρ, f ) ∈ Δ(T j × A j ) denote the following probability distributions over the types and actions of player j . Consider a pair (t j , a j ) ∈ T j × A j . We need to distinguish among different cases. First, suppose that there exists z * j = 1, . . . , n i such that: (i)
and (ii) for every triple (t j , z j , a j ) with
In this case, β i (t j , a j | t i , a i ; ρ, f ) is set equal to:
In all other cases, we set β i (t j , a j | t i , a i ; ρ, f ) equal to zero. Implicit in the construction of our beliefs is the idea that the deviations in which a player lies about his type are much less likely than the deviations in which the player is sincere and announces a number different from zero. Recall that ρ is admissible and, thus, there is nothing that reveals to a player who behaves correctly that his opponent was not sincere. We use the functions f 1 and f 2 to determine the most likely deviations and to compute the players' beliefs.
We are now ready to state our final result.
Theorem 4. Consider a two-person Bayesian game G. A mapping μ :T → Δ(A) is an SSCE of G if and only if there exist an admissible function ρ and a pair of functions
where
Consider the game with communication in which player i sends a message inM i and receives a recommendation in A i . The mediator chooses the recommendations according to ρ. Notice that ρ is not defined for a pair of messages (m 1 , m 2 ) that does not belong toM (that is, when both players report a number different from zero). As we shall see, in this case the value of ρ is irrelevant and can be chosen arbitrarily.
Suppose that conditions (ii)-(iv) are satisfied. It is easy to verify that the game just described admits an SE in which each player reveals his type truthfully and reports the number zero. Moreover, after sending message (t i , 0), type t i obeys all recommendations, both those that are expected (i.e., those that have positive probability when the opponent is sincere and announces the number zero) and those that are unexpected. Type t i also obeys any expected recommendation if he mistakenly sends message (t i , z i ) with z i > 0. Another feature of the SE is that a correct player never assigns positive probability to the event that the opponent lied about his type. 10 We conclude that the existence of a pair (ρ, f ) satisfying conditions (i)-(iv) is sufficient for an outcome μ to be an SSCE.
On the other hand, Theorem 4 states that conditions (i)-(iv) are also necessary. In the proof, we show that any SSCE of a two person game can be implemented with the game and the SE that we have illustrated above.
Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze games with communication under the assumption that players behave rationally in all events, including those that have zero probability. We show that this assumption has crucial implications on the effects of communication when the players believe that some type profiles are impossible. We define the notion of SSCE and show that it coincides with the concept of SCE in games with at least three players.
The concept of SSCE assumes that the players can communicate with a trustworthy mediator, although the mediator is not required to tremble. Using techniques from Gerardi (2004) it is possible to show that, under some weak conditions, the mediator is completely superfluous. In particular, suppose that the game has at least five players. An SSCE μ is rational if for every action profile a ∈ A and every type profile t ∈T the probability μ(a | t) is a rational number. Then any convex combination of rational SSCE can be implemented in SE with unmediated communication. Notice that in games with rational parameters any SSCE can be expressed as a convex combination of two or more rational SSCE. 11 We also show that in two-person games the concepts of SCE and SSCE do not coincide. We provide a characterization of the set of SSCE in games with two players. Perhaps, the complexity of the analysis when the mediator's trembles are not allowed suggests that, for most applications, it may be simpler to admit the possibility that the mediator makes mistakes and use the concept of SCE.
Notice that β(t, a | X) and β(t i , a i | X) are well defined since X is nonempty, and for every k and every t ∈ T the probability distribution μ k (t ) assigns strictly positive probability to any action profile in Q(t ).
Let α be the vector of nonnegative weights used in Definition 5 to demonstrate that B is a codominated system of actions. Recall that α i (a i | t i , a i ) = 0 if a i / ∈ B i (t i ). Consider the following weighted sum of the obedience constraints:
The variable y is nonnegative since Q and {μ k } ∞ k=1 satisfy constraints (3)- (5). Notice that y can be expressed as follows:
where the inequality follows from the fact that X is nonempty, B is a codominated system and α is the corresponding vector of weights. We therefore reach a contradiction and the proof of the lemma is complete.
Lemma 2. There exist two mediation ranges, B and Q, and a sequence {η k } ∞ k=1 of probability distributions over T ⊗ Q such that:
(i) B is a codominated system; (ii) For every i ∈ N and every t i ∈ T i :
, and for every a i ∈ A i :
Proof. Fix a (mixed-strategy) BNE ν * = (ν * 1 , . . . , ν * n ) of the game G. ν * i denotes the equilibrium strategy of player i and ν * i (t i ) ∈ Δ(t i ) is the probability distribution (over the set A i ) chosen by type t i . Let B 0 i (t i ) ⊆ A i denote the (possibly empty) set of actions that do not belong to the support of
. Given these sets, we construct the mediation ranges
Let ν denote the probability distribution over the set T × A given by:
There are two cases to consider. First, suppose that B 0 is a codominated system of actions. In this case, we set Q = Q 0 and
for every (t, a) ∈ T ⊗ Q 0 , and for every k = 1, 2, . . . . The mediation range Q and the constant sequence {η k } ∞ k=1 defined above clearly satisfy condition (iv) of Lemma 2 and the proof is complete.
We now turn to the second case and assume that B 0 is not a codominated system. We show that there exists a finite sequences of mediation ranges {B 1 , . (t i ). There exists a probability distribution π h ∈ Δ(T × A) such that:
The sequences {B 1 , . . . , B H } and {π 1 , . . . , π H } are constructed inductively as follows. If B h−1 is not a codominated system, then there exists a probability distribution π h ∈ Δ(T × A) such that
We let the set B h i (t i ) be equal to:
It is easy to check that B h and π h satisfy conditions (A.2) and (A.3). In this construction, the nonnegative integer i∈N t i∈T i |B h i (t i )| is strictly decreasing in h. Thus, the construction must terminate at a codominated system. Let B = B H and the mediation range Q be defined by Q i (t i ) = A i \B i (t i ) for every i and every t i . We now construct the sequence {η k } ∞ k=1 of probability distributions over T ⊗ Q (with full support). For every k = 1, 2, . . . , and every (t, a) ∈ T ⊗ Q let 
A.2. Proof of Theorem 2
Suppose that μ is an SSCE of the Bayesian game G. We let (σ, φ) denote the SE of the game with communication (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ) that induces μ. We also let {σ M,k } ∞ k=1 denote the sequence of completely mixed message strategy profiles that converges to σ M and that is used to compute the system of beliefs φ.
We now construct a mediation range Q and a sequence of mappings {μ k } ∞ k=1 from T into Δ(A) and show that the triple (μ, Q, {μ k } ∞ k=1 ) satisfies all the conditions of Definition 3. For every i ∈ N , and every t i ∈ T i , let Q i (t i ) be defined by: 
. . , is defined as follows. For every t ∈ T and every a ∈ Q(t) we let
It follows that μ k (t) ∈ Δ 0 (Q(t)) for every t and every k and lim k→∞ μ k (t) = μ(t) for every t.
To complete the proof we need to check condition (5). For every i ∈ N , t i ∈ T i , and a i ∈ Q i (t i ), let the set D i (t i , a i ) be equal to:
Fix a pair (t i , a i ) with a i ∈ Q i (t i ).
Notice that for every pair (m i , s i ) ∈ D i (t i , a i ), the probability distribution φ i (t i , m i , s i ) assigns probability zero to any pair (t −i , a −i ) that does not belong to the set (T ⊗ Q) −i (t i ). 13 By making a slight abuse of notation, we now view φ i (t i 
, m i , s i ) as an element of Δ((T ⊗ Q) −i (t i )).
Consider now the game in which the players announce their types to the mediator. If the profile of reports is t the mediator randomly chooses an action profile according to the probability distribution μ(t). Moreover, the mediator makes small mistakes and his trembles are described 13 Recall that φ i (t i (t i , a i ) . This concludes the proof of the theorem.
A.3. Proof of Theorem 3
Let μ be an SCE of G. It follows from the proof of Theorem 1 above that, without loss of generality, we can assume that the corresponding mediation range isQ and the mediator's trembles are described by the sequence of functions {μ k } ∞ k=k defined in Eq. (A.6). 14 Let 
(A.9)
Before constructing the game with communication and the SE that implement the SCE μ, we prove a preliminary result. Given the sequence {μ k } ∞ k=k , we show that there exists a finite sequence {μ 1 , . . . ,μ L } of functions from T into Δ(A) that satisfy the following two properties: (i)μ 1 (t) = μ(t) for every t ∈ T ; and (ii) for every t i ∈ T i , every a i ∈Q i (t i ), and every
, .9 ) and * is the smallest integer = 1, . . . , L for which
The functionsμ 1 , . . . ,μ L are constructed inductively. Letμ 1 = μ. We assume thatμ is given for 1. Let F denote the set:
If the set F is empty we stop the process and set L = . Otherwise, for every (t, a) ∈ F we defineμ
Moreover, for every pair (t, a) ∈ (T ⊗Q)\F we let
Clearly, the process must stop after finitely many iterations. It is easy to check that {μ 1 , . . . ,μ L } satisfy properties (i) and (ii) above. Finally, notice that for every = 1, . . . , L, every t ∈ T , and every a ∈ A\Q(t),μ (a|t) = 0.
Consider now the following game with communication (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ). The set of messages available to player i is:
where L is the length of the sequence {μ 1 , . . . ,μ L } defined above. The set of messages S i is equal to A i , the set of actions available to player i.
We now describe how the mediator selects an action profile (i.e., the function γ : M → Δ(A)). Let t be the profile of types announced by the players. If t ∈T \T then the mediator chooses an action profile randomly according to the probability distribution μ(t). Suppose now that t ∈ T . Let˜ = 1, . . . , L denote the second largest integer announced by the players (or the largest integer if this is announced by two or more players). Then the mediator selects an action profile randomly according to the probability distributionμ˜ (t), whereμ˜ is the˜ th element of the sequence {μ 1 , . . . ,μ L }.
We now construct an SE (σ, φ) of the game (G, (M i ) i∈N , (S i ) i∈N , γ ) that induces μ. For every i ∈ N , t i ∈ T i , we let M * i (t i ) denote the set of messages in which player i reveals his type truthfully. Formally, M * i (t i ) = (t i , z i ): z i = 1, . . . , L . In equilibrium, every type t i ∈ T i of player i ∈ N sends the message (t i , 1):
Moreover, type t i obeys every recommendation after sending a message m i ∈ M * i (t i ). As we shall show below, after sending a message m i ∈ M * i (t i ), type t i assigns probability zero to the event that his opponents have lied about their types. That is, type t i assigns probability zero to the event that type t j of player j = i sent a message m j / ∈ M * j (t j ). Therefore, it is not necessary to specify the actions that type t j chooses after he sends a message m j / ∈ M * j (t j ). 15 It remains to describe the sequence of completely mixed message strategy profiles {σ M,k } ∞ k=1 that converges to σ M and that determines the players' beliefs. Consider type t i ∈ T i . We let: 15 Of course, he will play the action that maximizes his expected payoff.
(ii) It follows from the definition ofρ andf i that at most n j messages can be kept in the setM i . Consider now the functionρ defined over the setM and the functionf i defined over the set T i × {1, . . . , n j }. It is easy to verify thatρ is admissible and thatρ andf = (f 1 ,f 2 ) satisfy conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 4.
Sufficiency
Let G be a two-person game. Consider an admissible function ρ and a function f = (f 1 , f 2 ) that satisfy conditions (i)-(iv) of Theorem 4. Let μ :T → Δ(A) be such that ρ((t 1 , 0), (t 2 , 0)) = μ(t 1 , t 2 ) for every (t 1 , t 2 ) ∈T . We now show that μ is an SSCE of G.
Consider the following game with communication (G,M 1 ,M 2 , A 1 , A 2 , γ ), whereM i is defined in Eq. (7) and γ :M 1 ×M 2 → Δ(A) is defined as follows. Recall that the setM defined in Eq. (8) We claim that the game with communication just described admits an SE with the following features. Consider player i with type t i . At the message stage he announces message (t i , 0). After announcing this message, type t i obeys any recommendation he receives from the mediator. Also, suppose that type t i sends (t i , z i ), with z i = 0, and receives a recommendation a i such that In this case, type t i obeys the recommendation and plays a i . We do not specify the actions chosen by t i in all other circumstances (see below). It is clear that the strategy profile described above induces the outcome μ.
It follows from condition (ii) of Theorem 4 that type t i does not have an incentive to announce a message different from (t i , 0) or to disobey a recommendation that has positive probability when both players follow their equilibrium strategies at the message stage. Furthermore, condition (iii) of Theorem 4 implies that after sending (mistakenly) message (t i , z i ), z i = 0, type t i does not want to disobey the recommendation to play an action a i that has positive probability when the opponent follows his equilibrium strategy.
It remains to show that after sending message (t i , 0), type t i has an incentive to obey the unexpected recommendations (i.e., those recommendations that have zero probability when the opponent follows his equilibrium strategy). To do this we need to construct a consistent system of beliefs. We consider the following sequence of mixed message strategies. Let {ε k } ∞ k=1 be a sequence of positive numbers in the unit interval converging to zero. Along the sequence, we assume that type t i reports message (t i , z i ), z i = 0, with probability (ε k ) f i (t i ,z i ) . Moreover, type t i announces any message (t i , z i ), t i = t i and z i = 0, . . . , n j , with probability (ε k ) n j |T i |+1 .
Consider type t i and suppose that he sends message (t i , 0) and receives the unexpected recommendation a i . The trembles described above guarantee that the beliefs of type t i are given by β i (· | t i , a i ; ρ, f ) (see Eq. (9)). It then follows from condition (iv) of Theorem 4 that it is optimal for type t i to play action a i .
